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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, employee benefit plans have provided financial
security and accessible capital during retirement for laborers worldwide.
The United States first introduced its large-scale pension plans in the
wake of the Civil War.1 Due to the leadership of various labor unions in
the decades following the war, many state and local governments, as well
as private corporations, established such plans for their employees.2 As
of 2007, approximately 124 million employees maintained retirement
plans.3
By the end of the twentieth century, the growth of employee
retirement benefit plans caused an increase in claims of abuse regarding
employer compliance. 4 In response, regulation attempts began at the
state and local levels. 5 In 1974, however, the federal government
stepped in with a comprehensive system of regulation entitled the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 6 This statute
establishes disclosure requirements and puts in place systematic
enforcement mechanisms to ensure uniformity and consistency.7
ERISA establishes various reporting and disclosure requirements in
accordance with its stated policy to increase the likelihood that
participants and beneficiaries under employer-provided pension plans
will receive their full benefits. 8 The administrator of each employee
benefit plan must furnish 9 to each plan participant and beneficiary a
1 Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 563 (2006).
2 Id.
3 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN
HISTORICAL
TABLES
AND
GRAPHS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2007pensionplanbulletin.PDF.
4 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 3 (1973).
5 Id.
6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
7 See supra note 4, at 1–2.
8 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (2006).
9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (2006). In conjunction with certain required timeframes
within which the plan administrator must furnish information to the plan participants and
beneficiaries, the administrator is also required to furnish such information as may be
received, in the form of a written request, by the participant or beneficiary. Id.
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summary of the plan description 10 and pension benefit statements 11 at
designated intervals. 12
Plan administrators must also file reports,
including publicly accessible financial and actuarial statements along
with opinions issued by independent qualified specialists.13 In addition
to the mandatory disclosure requirements, ERISA permits the Secretary
of Labor 14 to issue regulations establishing further responsibilities for
plan administrators. For example, the Secretary may require, by
regulation or otherwise, 15 that the administrator furnish to each
participant and beneficiary a statement of his or her rights. 16 The
comprehensive duty to disclose, together with the reporting requirements
enumerated in section 1021, are indicative of the extensive responsibility
endowed upon plan administrators and of Congress’s desire to ensure
that the interested parties are well informed.
ERISA also establishes certain participation and vesting
requirements. For example, an employer may not condition participation
in the plan on an employee’s completion of a term of service extending
beyond either the later of one year of service, or the employee’s twentyfirst birthday. 17 Each pension plan must provide that an employee’s
rights to his normal retirement benefits, his own contributions, and one
hundred percent of his employer’s contributions after a certain period of
service, are nonforfeitable 18 upon the attainment of normal retirement
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006). Each plan must include the required information
specified in § 1022(b) and must be written, “in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to
reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations
under the plan.” Id.
11 The statements shall include: the total benefits accrued and the nonforfeitable
pension benefits. It shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
average plan participant, and may be delivered in any appropriate form so long as it is
reasonably accessible to the participant or beneficiary. See § 1025(a)(1)(B)(ii)(2) (2006).
12 See 29 U.S.C. § 1025 (2006).
13 29 U.S.C. § 1026 (2006).
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). This section explains the dual enforcement
responsibilities of the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Treasury. For example, the
Department of Treasury has statutory authority for minimum standards—funding,
participation and vesting of benefit rights. Id. The Department of Labor will have
statutory authority for fiduciary obligations and veto power over any Treasury decisions
that significantly affect collectively bargained plans. Id. The Treasury has the authority
to audit plans and levy tax penalties, while the Department of Labor maintains the
authority to bring a civil action against plans and plan fiduciaries. Id.
15 29 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
16 29 U.S.C. § 1024(c) (2006).
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006).
18 “Nonforfeitable” is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002 as: “[A] claim obtained by a
participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a
pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, which is unconditional, and
which is legally enforceable against the plan.” Id.
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age. 19 Additionally, ERISA establishes certain accrual requirements,20
minimum funding standards, 21 and the manner and method of benefit
payments.22
Most importantly, in order to secure proper compliance with
ERISA’s requirements, Congress established plan fiduciaries, whose
exclusive purpose is to discharge their duties for the benefit of the
participants and beneficiaries.23 These fiduciaries must act with the same
degree of care that a “prudent man” would, if he or she acted in similar
circumstances.24 In addition, a fiduciary is liable for any breach of other
fiduciaries’ responsibilities: (1) if he knowingly participates or conceals
any act or omission of another fiduciary, (2) if he enables such other
fiduciary to commit a breach, or (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by
another fiduciary and makes no effort to remedy it. 25 If a fiduciary
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed by
ERISA, then he is personally liable to such plan for any losses resulting
from the breach, any profits made through the use of plan assets, and any
other equitable relief necessary.26 Conscious of public policy concerns,
section 1110 similarly imposes strong burdens on fiduciaries by voiding
any provision in an agreement or any other instrument that purports to
relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any obligation or
duty established under ERISA.27
To further promote its compliance scheme and foster adherence to
the substantive provisions of the Act, ERISA includes a provision
protecting individuals against retaliation.28 The antiretaliation provision
of ERISA—section 510 29 —prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee who has “given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [ERISA.]” 30
Similarly, section 510 prohibits the use of coercive interference in the

19

See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2006).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006).
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1085 (2006).
22 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2006).
23 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006).
24 Id.
25 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2006).
26 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006).
28 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987) (analyzing the
antiretaliation and enforcement mechanisms in the FLSA in order to create an
environment fostering compliance with the substantive provisions of that Act).
29 Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006), this provision is referred to as “section 510”
because it falls within part five, section 510 of the act in its original form. See Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829.
30 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
20

2011]

CAN YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ANYWHERE?

163

exercise of any right to which a participant or beneficiary is entitled, or
may become entitled.31
In practice, this statutory definition has elicited varying
interpretations as to which employees are protected under section 510;
the controversy is based on the form of the information that employees
provide with respect to ERISA violations. On one end of the spectrum
are employees who give information during the course of a formal
administrative or agency investigation, or during litigation. Section 510
undoubtedly protects these employees. At the other end of the spectrum
are the employees who, of their own volition, provide information to
their employers regarding perceived violations of ERISA. In the middle
of the spectrum are the employees who report violations after their
employers solicit them for such information.
The two latter categories of employees are the subject of a current
circuit split that focuses upon their rights and protections under section
510. The Third and Fourth Circuits held that section 510 does not
protect employees who make internal complaints, regardless of form.32
By contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpreted section 510 more
broadly, holding that it covers all types of internal complaints. 33 The
Second Circuit has taken a different approach, holding that employees
who provide information after being solicited are protected under section
510, but those who provide unsolicited information are not.34 With the
Supreme Court’s recent refusal to address the courts’ inconsistent
applications of section 510 protection, the circuit split remains relevant
and highly controversial.35
This Comment argues in favor of a broad application of section 510
protections to unsolicited internal complaints made by participants of
ERISA plans to their supervisors or managers. Part II discusses the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of ERISA, the purposes and
objectives of the statute, and the policy concerns it seeks to address. Part
II also introduces two other pieces of federal legislation that contain
antiretaliation provisions: the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)36 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).37 These statutes provide a
31

29 U.S.C. § 1141 (2006).
Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); see also
King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
33 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
34 Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005).
35 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S.Ct. 1604 (2011).
36 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
32
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point of comparison because they, respectively, reflect stricter and more
lenient antiretaliation provisions than ERISA.
Part III of this Comment addresses the current circuit split
regarding the application of section 510 to unsolicited internal
complaints. This split places the Fifth and Ninth Circuits at one end of
the spectrum and the Third and Fourth Circuits at the other end.38 The
Second Circuit further divides the split by utilizing a different
approach.39 Part IV provides a detailed analysis of the language used in
the whistleblower provisions contained in ERISA, the FLSA, and Title
VII. Part IV also discusses the relevant case law that applies the
antiretaliation provisions of the FLSA, Title VII, and other statutes to
shed light on the relevant ERISA provision. Further, Part IV examines
the germane public policy considerations and posits how to preserve the
congressional intent behind ERISA while maintaining the rights of
employees.
This Comment concludes with a summary of the conflicting
authority and the importance of a uniform and consistent application of
section 510. It stresses the public policy arguments in favor of a broad
application of the whistleblower provision, as well as the inadequacy of a
narrow interpretation. Ultimately, it argues that courts should extend
security for employees as a mechanism to ensure employer compliance
with the terms of this comprehensive piece of legislation.
II. BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND A COMPARISON OF SECTION 510 AND
OTHER SIMILAR WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
Congress enacted ERISA in response to the rapid and substantial
increase in employee benefit plans.40 Finding that the “operational scope
and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate[,]” and
because of the national interest involved, Congress endeavored to create
adequate disclosure and enforcement minimum standards. 41 The
resulting remedies, sanctions, and accessibility to courts gave substance
to ERISA’s declared policy of promoting and securing employees’
interests.42 Congress structured ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism
to give several different kinds of plaintiffs standing to bring an action on
behalf of plan participants.43 Furthermore, “ERISA also expanded the
38 Compare Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315, and Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411, with
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223, and King, 337 F.3d 427.
39 See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330.
40 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
41 Id.
42 Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV.
631, 632 (1994).
43 Id.
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class of potential defendants by liberally defining the status of plan
fiduciary. Such an expansion sent a clear signal that Congress would no
longer tolerate the fraudulent practices that characterized much of preERISA employee benefit law.”44
Section 510 of ERISA prohibits employers both from
discriminating against an employee based on eligibility for benefits and
also from retaliating against an employee who asserts rights under
ERISA:45
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan [or] this title . . . or for
the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled under the plan [or]
this title[.] It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel or discriminate against any person because he has
given information or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]46

For a comprehensive analysis of section 510’s antiretaliation
provision, it is useful to compare its language with that of analogous
whistleblower provisions contained in previously enacted and interpreted
legislation. In particular, this Comment examines section 215 of the
FLSA47 and section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48
The FLSA, an important component of President Roosevelt’s New
Deal program, provides for a nationwide minimum wage and an
overtime premium in the private market. 49 Section 215 of this Act
prohibits employer retaliation in response to employees asserting their
rights to minimum wage and hour standards in the workplace. 50 It
prohibits the “discharge or in any other manner [the] discriminat[ion]
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or relating to

44

Id.
Jared Goldstein, Employment Discrimination Claims Under ERISA Section 510:
Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and Plan Remedies?, 93 MICH. L. REV.
193, 194 (1994).
46 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
47 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
48 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
49 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of The Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 328 (2005).
50 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
45
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this Act . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding[.]”51
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII of the Act
specifically prohibits employer retaliation against an employee who
asserts his or her rights by alleging discrimination by the employer on the
basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability.52 This section deems it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to “discriminate against any of his employees or applicants
for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”53
Courts and scholars compare section 510 of ERISA to both of the
whistleblower provisions described above. 54 In particular, courts
acknowledge the difference in the language used by Congress in the
three legislative acts, and interpret this to signify varying objectives and
intentions. 55 As such, in the absence of an explicit Supreme Court
holding regarding section 510’s application to unsolicited internal
complaints, courts’ various interpretations of the FLSA and Title VII
provide useful guidance.
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 510 TO UNSOLICITED
INTERNAL COMPLAINTS
Courts struggle with the application of section 510 to cases in
which an aggrieved employee makes a complaint within the company

51

29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16a (2006).
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
54 See Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987) (agreeing with
Judge Sarokin’s majority opinion in McLendon v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 602 F.Supp. 1492,
1503–04 (D.N.J. 1985), that just as Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on
the basis of one’s race, so too does ERISA’s section 510 prohibit discrimination in the
workplace with respect to pension benefits on the basis of one’s proximity to obtaining
such benefits); see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir.
2010); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327–28 (2d Cir. 2005) (comparing
section 510 of ERISA with section 215 of the FLSA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act); King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying its
interpretation in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that section 215 of the FLSA is more narrow than that of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because of the use of words such as “proceeding,” “testify” and
“institute”).
55 See King, 337 F.3d at 427; see also Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327–28; see also
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223–25.
52
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alleging violations of the ERISA statute. 56 The current circuit split
highlights the disparity between purposive and textual approaches to
statutory interpretation—the Fifth and Ninth Circuits fall in the former
category, and the Third and Fourth Circuits fall in the latter. The Second
Circuit takes a slightly different approach, affording protection to
internal complaints that are solicited, but not to those that are unsolicited.
“Textualism posits that courts are bound by a statute’s plain meaning,
and that consideration of legislative history, spirit, or purpose is
inappropriate in attempting to discern statutory meaning.”57 On the other
hand, under the purposivist approach courts read statutory language in
the context of the statute’s often-unarticulated purposes. 58 Thus, it is
possible “for some source, such as legislative history or apparent spirit or
purpose, to trump the statutory text[.]”59 Utilizing these approaches in
the context of section 510, the variation hinges on the meaning of the
words “inquiry or proceeding.” The former two circuits look to the
legislative intent and read the language as encompassing all internal
complaints, while the latter two circuits apply a strict analysis of the
literal meaning of the words in the statute—finding that the language of
section 510 only includes complaints or information provided during
formal administrative or judicial proceedings.
A. Purposive Approach: Unsolicited Internal Complaints are Protected
Under Section 510 of ERISA Because of Public Policy Justifications
Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have held that section 510’s
protection against improper terminations due to reporting ERISA
violations—either potential or actual—encompasses unsolicited internal
complaints. The Ninth Circuit found that public policy demands
protection of such individuals because unsolicited internal complaints are
the first step in providing information or testifying about a violation.60
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted section 510 broadly and found that
the provision includes unsolicited internal complaints within its ambit.61
The Ninth Circuit addressed the applicability of section 510 to such
internal complaints in Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii.62 In this case, the
appellant initially brought an action against her former employer in

56

Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220–21.
Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1886
(2008).
58 Id. at 1898.
59 Id. at 1898–99.
60 Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
61 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1994).
62 Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 408.
57
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which she alleged violations of state wrongful discharge law. 63
Appellant asserted that she voiced concerns to her supervisors several
times between 1989 and 1990 about “potential and/or actual violations
by the [b]ank of the reporting and disclosure requirements and fiduciary
standards of ERISA.” 64 In response to her assertions, appellant
maintained that the respondent improperly terminated her.65
The court found that the case was properly before it 66 and the
appellant had standing 67 because ERISA is clearly meant to protect
whistleblowers. 68 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that “[t]he
normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way that might
tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present the problem first
to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan.”69 If one is subsequently
discharged for addressing the problem, then “the process of giving
information or testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory
discharge discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”70
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp.,71 interpreted section 510 broadly, concluding that the preemption
provision of ERISA is “deliberately expansive . . . [and] is to be
construed extremely broadly.” 72 In this case, the complaint alleged a
request by the employer to commit illegal acts, plaintiff’s refusal to do
so, plaintiff’s reporting of such requests to management, and his
subsequent termination.73 While not explicitly relying on Hashimoto, the
63

An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against
an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions,
location or privileges of employment because: (1) [t]he employee, or a
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to a
public body, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a
law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this [s]tate, a political subdivision of
this [s]tate, or the United States, unless the employee knows that the report
is false[.]
Id. at 409 (citing Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, H.R.S. § 378-62 (2002)).
64 Id. at 409.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 410. The Ninth Circuit found that, regardless of the well-pleaded complaint
rule, ERISA completely preempts pension plans such as the one involved in this case.
Therefore, despite the appellant’s reliance on state law, the controlling law here is
ERISA.
67 McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CV-05-087-S-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43579, at *14 (D. Idaho June 9, 2005) (“The Ninth Circuit could not have
concluded that ERISA preemption applied without the determination that the former
employee was qualified to assert ERISA participation protection.”).
68 Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994).
72 Id. at 1316 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
73 Id. at 1312–13.
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Fifth Circuit employed similar reasoning. The court looked to Supreme
Court precedent, which has “consistently emphasized the expansiveness
of the ‘relate to’ standard.”74 The “relate to” standard applies to the
interpretation of section 502,75 which preempts state laws that relate to an
ERISA benefit plan. In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that
“a plaintiff could recover in a wrongful discharge action if he established
that the principal reason for his termination was the employer’s desire to
avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee’s pension
fund.”76 Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the complete preemption
provision broadly, finding that a state law relates to an ERISA plan “if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”77 Therefore, the court
in Anderson reasoned that section 510 likewise deserves a broad
interpretation encompassing unsolicited internal complaints made by
employees.
Neither circuit undertook a detailed analysis of the literal meaning
of the text in the statute; instead, the courts embraced an interpretation in
light of the legislative history and public policy considerations.
Subsequently, lower courts have followed and applied the reasoning of
both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. The United States District Court for
the District of Idaho applied Hashimoto and concluded that “an
employee can invoke [section 510] by simply presenting the ERISA
problem first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan.” 78
Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held
that “the activity protected under [s]ection 510 includes internal
complaints made by an employee.”79 Following this reasoning, section
510’s antiretaliation provision affords protection to an employee who
presents unsolicited complaints to management. Likewise, in its analysis
of the case law on point, the District Court in the Northern District of
Ohio summed up the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Anderson: “‘Reporting
[ERISA] violations to management[]’ would qualify a person for the
74

Id. at 1316 (citation omitted).
Codified at 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(a), this provision is referred to as “section 502”
because it fell within part five, section 502 of the act in its original form. See supra note
46.
76 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136 (1990) (internal citations
omitted).
77 Id. at 139 (internal citations omitted).
78 See Momchilov v. McIlvaine Trucking, Int’l, Inc., No: 5:09CV1322, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2010) (citing Anderson v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994)).
79 Dunn v. Elco Enters., Inc., No. 05-71801, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *14
(E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006); see also Momchilov, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *14–
15.
75
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protections granted under ERISA [section] 510.”80 In choosing to follow
the interpretation of the Fifth Circuit, the court held that section 510 of
ERISA protects unsolicited internal complaints made by an employee to
management.81
B. Textual Approach: Unsolicited Internal Complaints are not Protected
Under Section 510 of ERISA Because they are not Compatible with the
Literal Meaning of the Text
Addressing the status of unsolicited internal complaints and their
protection under section 510, the Fourth and Third Circuits have found
that principles of statutory interpretation demand that the words “inquiry
or proceeding” be afforded their literal meaning.82 This requires a formal
administrative or judicial proceeding before the statute’s protections
attach.83 The Fourth Circuit has held that use of the phrase “testified or
is about to testify” in section 510 suggests that “inquiry or proceeding” is
limited to “legal or administrative, or at least to something more formal
than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor.”84 Similarly, the
Third Circuit has recently interpreted section 510 narrowly, finding that
internal complaints are not protected.85
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the application of section 510 to
unsolicited internal complaints in King v. Marriot International, Inc.86
King was an employee in Marriott’s benefits department, and the
controversy involved a proposal to transfer millions of dollars from
Marriott’s medical plan to its general corporate reserves account.87 King
doubted the appropriateness—and legality under ERISA—of the transfer
and expressed her concerns to the Senior Vice President of
Compensation and Benefits and to other coworkers. 88 Marriott
International subsequently terminated King after she objected to the
80 Momchilov, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *15 (internal citation omitted); see
also Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *11.
81 Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *14.
82 See King v. Marriot Int’l, 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Edwards v.
A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2010).
83 Section 510 states that: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or
has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this [Act].” 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
84 King, 337 F.3d at 427.
85 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225–26.
86 King, 337 F.3d at 421. King initiated her action in state court where she alleged a
violation of Maryland state law as well as ERISA. The defendants removed the case to
federal court due to complete preemption by ERISA, and the appellant appealed the
decision of complete preemption. Id. at 422–23.
87 Id. at 423.
88 Id.
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proposed transfer of funds for the third time. Her termination was
purportedly due to her continuing feud with a coworker, which “hindered
the operation of the benefits department.”89
The court focused its discussion of section 510 on the meaning of
the phrase “inquiry or proceeding.”90 The Fourth Circuit also considered
similar antiretaliation provisions under the FLSA and Title VII. 91 It
determined that “the use of the phrase ‘testified or is about to testify’
does suggest that the phrase ‘inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]’ referenced in
section 510 is limited to the legal or administrative, or at least to
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a
supervisor.” 92 Furthermore, the court found that “the phrase ‘given
information’ ensures that even the non-testimonial information (such as
incriminating documents) in any inquiry or proceeding would also be
covered.”93 Consequently, the court expressly disagreed with Anderson
and Hashimoto in reaching its conclusion that the protections of section
510 do not extend to such unsolicited, internal complaints.94
Following similar reasoning, the Third Circuit recently entered the
fray with its decision in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc. The Third
Circuit agreed with the King court and held that “unsolicited internal
complaints are not protected under [s]ection 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1140.”95 A.H. Cornell hired Edwards as Director of Human Resources.96
His duties involved oversight of the company’s group health insurance
plan, governed by ERISA, in which he was also a participant.97 When
Edwards discovered that A.H. Cornell was engaged in several ERISA
violations, she complained about them to management; shortly after, the
company terminated her.98
The court began its discussion by acknowledging the circuit split
regarding whether section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints.
Next, it proceeded with statutory interpretation because “‘absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must
89

Id.
Id. at 427.
91 Id.
92 King, 337 F.3d at 427 (internal italics omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (“[i]t
shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel or discriminate against
any person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any
inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]”).
93 Id. at 427.
94 Id. at 428.
95 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis
removed).
96 Id. at 218.
97 Id.
98 Id.
90
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ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’”99 The court concluded—as did
the Fourth Circuit in King—that the use of the phrase “testified or is
about to testify” implies that the phrase “inquiry or proceeding” is to be
limited to more formal actions.100 The court found that “[i]n drafting
[section 510], Congress could have used broad language similar to that
present in the anti-retaliation provision in [Title VII].” 101 Because
Congress declined to utilize such language, a narrow reading was
appropriate.102 The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, recommended
that section 510 of ERISA be given a broader reading because failure to
protect internal complaints would “undermine the provision’s purpose, as
‘it would permit an employer to terminate an employee upon the
employee first notifying the employer of the ERISA violation[.]’”103 The
Third Circuit declined to give deference to the Secretary of Labor’s
amicus brief because the Secretary “has not pointed to any regulations,
rulings, or other material in support of its position[,]” and therefore, “we
do not apply Chevron deference to ‘agency litigat[ion] positions that are
wholly unsupported by regulations, ruling, or administrative
practice[.]’”104
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of agency deference is
questionable at best. While the Secretary pointed to no specific
regulation,105 the Secretary stressed that the agency’s practice depends
upon a broad reading of the whistleblower provisions’ protections.106 It
is true that deference is not due when the agency’s position is
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice; 107 but
here, the Secretary clearly pointed to relevant administrative practices.
As the Supreme Court held in Chevron, “a court may not substitute its

99

Id. at 222 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 223.
101 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 224 (quoting Appellant Brief ¶ 14, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610
F.3d 217, 224 (2010)).
104 Id. at 225 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). The court’s reference to
Chevron deference relates to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (holding that where Congress implicitly grants
legislative delegation to an agency, the court shall not disturb the agency’s interpretation
of a statutory provision). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
105 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225.
106 Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Appellant for
Reversal 30–31, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
107 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 212 (1988)).
100
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own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”108
C. A Third Approach: While Unsolicited Internal Complaints are
Unprotected Under Section 510, Solicited Internal Complaints Find
Shelter Within the Provision.
With its decision in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc. in 2005, the
Second Circuit entered the debate. 109 Horizon hired Nicolaou as the
Director of Human Resources and Administration in July 1998.110 In her
capacity as the fiduciary and trustee, she oversaw the implementation of
Horizon’s 401(k) employee benefits plan as regulated by ERISA. 111 She
was also a plan participant. 112 Shortly after her employment began,
Nicolaou discovered “a serious payroll discrepancy involving
underpayment of overtime to all non-exempt employees of the New York
City and Los Angeles offices.”113 Because of the length of time that the
discrepancy had persisted, the complaint alleged that it was “a historical
under funding of Horizon’s 401(k) plan.”114
Upon notification of the problem, Horizon’s Chief Financial
Officer, Jerry Riley, advised Nicolaou to disregard the matter. 115
Nicolaou also raised the issue with Horizon’s Controller on two
occasions and encountered the same indifference. 116 Convinced that
Horizon refused to rectify the discrepancy, Nicolaou brought it to the
attention of Mark Silverman, Horizon’s general counsel. Mr. Silverman
conducted his own investigation and subsequently verified Nicolaou’s
findings.117
At a meeting in November of 1999, Nicolaou and Silverman
informed Horizon’s President, William Koenigsberg, of the payroll
problem.118 Koenigsberg appeared “disturbed . . . and not at all pleased
that this issue was being brought to his attention.”119 Within days of this
meeting with Koenigsberg, the company first replaced Nicolaou’s

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 326 (internal citations omitted).
Nicolaou, 401 F.3d at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Human Resources position with another employee and then terminated
Nicolaou.120
In its discussion, the Second Circuit compared section 510 of
ERISA to the analogous whistleblower provisions of the FLSA and Title
VII. 121 It found that the antiretaliation provision of ERISA is
“unambiguously broader in scope than [s]ection 15(a)(3) of FLSA.”122
First, the Second Circuit—in comparing the language of both the
FLSA 123 and ERISA 124 whistleblower provisions—agreed with the
Secretary of Labor that “whatever level of formality is implied by the
term “proceeding”’ in FLSA, the use of the somewhat less formal term
“inquiry” in ERISA is indicative of an intent ‘to ensure protection for
those involved in the informal gathering of information.’”125 Thus, the
term “inquiry” is broad enough to include any request for information.126
The court held that the lower court erred in its decision that Nicolaou’s
allegations do not fall within the meaning of the term “inquiry or
proceeding” as a matter of law.127 While the meeting with Koenigsberg
was “something less than a formal proceeding,” it was sufficient to
constitute an inquiry under section 510, as long as Nicolaou could show
she was solicited for the meeting.128
In so holding, the Second Circuit did not find its conclusion to be in
conflict with King, which held that “inquiry or proceeding” as used in
section 510 applies only to “‘the legal or administrative, or at least . . .
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a
supervisor.’”129 The Court in Nicolaou believed that the “proper focus is
not on the formality or informality of the circumstances under which an
individual gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances
120

Id. at 326–27.
Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327–28.
122 Id. at 328 (emphasis removed).
123 [T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act . . . or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on
an industry committee.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added).
124 “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1140
(2010) (emphasis added).
125 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328–29 (quoting Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae 18, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005)).
126 Id. at 329.
127 Id. at 330.
128 Id.
129 Id. (quoting King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003)).
121

2011]

CAN YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ANYWHERE?

175

can fairly be deemed to constitute an ‘inquiry.’”130 The court rejected
the Fourth Circuit’s blanket denial of all section 510 protection, unless in
the presence of a formal legal or administrative proceeding.131 Instead,
the Second Circuit determined that if the employer affirmatively seeks
information regarding a statutory violation, and the employee responds to
such a request, then the employee’s response is protected under section
510.132 Despite declining to extend this conclusion to unsolicited internal
complaints, the Second Circuit did not see its decision as conflicting with
the holding in King.133
The Second Circuit’s line of reasoning develops a third branch in
the circuit split. Much disagreement has resulted over how to interpret
the Second Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou.
The Third Circuit
undoubtedly viewed the Second Circuit as being in agreement with the
Fourth Circuit, regarding the debate over whether section 510
encompasses unsolicited internal complaints. 134 Both the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York, however, interpreted the Second
Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou to permit less formal complaints—such as
complaints made to management—to constitute an “inquiry” under
section 510.135
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: PRESERVING CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT AND THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE WORKPLACE TO
MONITOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THEIR PENSION PLANS
Due to the expressed legislative intent, relevant public policy
considerations, and the uniqueness of ERISA’s complete preemption
provision, the current circuit split should be resolved in favor of allowing
protection under section 510 for unsolicited internal complaints. In the
midst of an economic recession, can employees approaching their
retirement years have security in their knowledge that they have been
accumulating wealth through their employer-provided and federally
regulated pension plans? As a society, citizens are encouraged to
understand the law of the land, to educate themselves, and—if need be—
to monitor employer actions ensuring compliance with the law. To
punish a proactive employee who properly seeks to ensure compliance
with federal laws flagrantly disregards these principles. Particularly in
130

Id.
Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220–22 (3d Cir. 2010).
135 Higueros v. Catholic Health Plan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see
also Ello v. Singh, 531 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
131

176

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 8:159

light of ERISA’s unique complete preemption provision 136 —which
ensures that federal law preempts any dispute encroaching upon the
policy behind ERISA—courts should closely monitor the judicial relief
available to disgruntled workers in order to ensure uniformity and
consistency.
When predicting how the Supreme Court would rule on this circuit
split, it is appropriate to examine where the current Justices fall in the
textualist/purposivist debate. Justices Scalia and Thomas are selfprofessed textualists. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito and Justice
Kennedy likely also fall in this category. 137 On the other side of the
debate one could expect to find the liberal justices, such as Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, and one would assume the new Justices Sotomayor
and Kagan.138 While this ideological division suggests that the Court’s
majority would follow the textualist approach, the positions of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are debatable. 139 In various cases,

136

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
Smith, supra note 57, at 14. There are some indications that Justice Alito considers
himself a textualist. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 334–
35 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the meaning of “a strong inference” of
scienter under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); see also BP Am. Prod. Co. v.
Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91–92 (2006) (relying on “ordinary meaning” of the statutory text);
see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 350 (2006) (“When I interpret statutes . . . where I
start and often where I end is with the text of the statute.”). Alternatively, there is
evidence that he does not consider himself a textualist. For example, he joined Justice
Souter’s arguably nontextualist partial dissent in Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 492
(2007) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If I could not go beyond
statutory text . . . a coin toss would be my only way to judgment. But I look to
congressional purpose . . . .”), and in Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550
U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting), he declined to join Justice Scalia’s textualist
dissent. As for Chief Justice Roberts, it is also unclear whether he considers himself a
textualist, see, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to
Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 319–20 (2005) (indicating some willingness to consider legislative history in
certain circumstances), but he generally joins opinions by the Court’s textualists, see,
e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined
by Roberts, C.J.); Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.);
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 328 (2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.).
138 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative
History: Principle, Strategy and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117,
120 (2008) (classifying Justices Ginsburg and Breyer as liberals for the purposes of their
investigation); see also Brandon J. Almas, From One [Expletive] Policy to the Next: The
FCC’s Regulation of “Fleeting Expletives” and the Supreme Court’s Response, 63 FED.
COMM. L.J. 261, 282 (2010) (acknowledging that while it is assumed that Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan will vote liberally—because they replaced liberal Justices Souter
and Stevens, respectively—their voting history is not reliable).
139 Smith, supra note 57, at 14.
137
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Justice Alito has declined to join the textualists.140 Similarly, in Chief
Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearing, he stated a willingness to
consider legislative history in certain instances.141 Even assuming that
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts fall into the textualist group,
when evaluating the text of the ERISA statute as a whole and considering
how the complete preemption provision effectively eliminates a state law
remedy, these Justices could find that the text of the statute supports an
inference that all employee complaints should be protected.
A. ERISA’s Complete Preemption Provision is Unique in Comparison
with the FLSA and Title VII Statutes.
Both FLSA and Title VII have their own enforcement mechanisms,
but neither statute calls for complete preemption in the field by the
federal courts. The Fair Labor Standards Act permits an aggrieved
worker to seek a judicial remedy at the federal, state, or local levels.142
Furthermore, section 218c(b)(2) of the statute provides that: “[n]othing in
this section shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or
remedies of any employee under any Federal or State law or under any
collective bargaining agreement. The rights and remedies in this section
may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of
employment.”143
Similarly, Title VII does not preempt state and local laws and
regulations regarding workplace discrimination, but rather supplements

140 See Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 492 (where Justice Alito joined Justice Souter’s
nontextualist partial dissent); see also Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (where Justice Alito declined
to join Justice Scalia’s textualist dissent).
141 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States supra note 137 and accompanying text.
142 Under 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006) of FLSA, Congress explicitly established:
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse
noncompliance with any [f]ederal or [s]tate law or municipal ordinance
establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established
under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum
workweek established under this chapter, and no provision of this chapter
relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with
any [f]ederal or [s]tate law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher
standard than the standard established under this chapter. No provision of
this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him,
which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or
justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him,
which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
143 29 U.S.C. § 218c(b)(2) (2006). See Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632
F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the language of § 218(a) effectively preserves
state and local regulation).
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them. 144 Indeed, section 2000e-7, in discussing the effect of the
subchapter on state laws, notes that they maintain their authority. 145
More specifically, Congress explicitly states that it does not seek to
preempt state law in the field of discrimination in the workplace on the
basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or
disability.146
ERISA section 510 is different from the analogous antiretaliation
provisions of the FLSA and Title VII because it operates under the
doctrine of federal preemption. In practice, this doctrine invalidates all
state law claims. As such, if an employee is denied protection under the
ERISA whistleblower provision, he or she is prevented from obtaining
relief. A state law claim is preempted under ERISA when it “relates to”
an ERISA benefit plan.147 “A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan,
in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference
to such a plan.”148 Keeping this controlling doctrine in mind emphasizes
the dangers of adhering to the textualist approach because narrowly
construing the statute would undoubtedly leave many employees without
a remedy at federal or state law.

144 See Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“Title VII does not itself prevent [s]tates from extending their nondiscrimination laws to
areas not covered by Title VII.”); see also Wymer v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 671
F.Supp. 210, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that “Title VII was designed to supplement
rather than supplant existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination.”).
145 The relevant statutory text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006) is:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or
future law of any [s]tate or political subdivision of a [s]tate, other than any
such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which
would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2006):
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title
operates to the exclusion of [s]tate laws on the same subject matter, nor shall
any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of
[s]tate law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of
this Act, or any provision thereof.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4.
147 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983)).
148 Id.
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B. Legislative Intent and Public Policy Justifications Demand a Broader
Interpretation of Section 510 than that Established in the Third and
Fourth Circuits’ Jurisprudence.
ERISA is a remedial statute and as such, should be liberally
construed in favor of protecting the employee. 149 One of Congress’s
central objectives in enacting the complex legislation was to promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries.150 In addition, Congress
included various safeguards for the purpose of deterring abuse and
“completely secur[ing] the rights and expectations brought into being by
[ERISA.]”151 Specifically, Senate Report 93-127 clearly indicates that
the committee added section 510 because of “evidence that in some plans
a worker’s pension rights or the expectations of those rights were
interfered with by the use of economic sanctions or violent reprisals.”152
The Committee concluded that safeguards are “required to preclude this
type of abuse from being carried out and in order to completely secure
the rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform
legislation.”153 With regard to its inclusion of the section 510 safeguards,
the Committee’s stated intention was “to provide the full range of legal
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear
to
have
hampered
effective
enforcement
of
fiduciary
154
As such, the antiretaliation provision of ERISA
responsibilities[.]”
plays a fundamental role in the proper implementation of the entire
statutory scheme because it helps to make ERISA’s assurances
credible. 155 Recognizing the purposes underlying ERISA, it is
counterintuitive that Congress would exclude employees who are
discharged for bringing an ERISA-related concern to the attention of
their manager or supervisor from the protection of the remedial
antiretaliation provision.156 It is also beneficial to employers to have the
statute read broadly, as it permits them to rectify any violations before
being the subject of a formal administrative investigation or disciplinary
actions.
149 IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Baker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d
Cir. 1986).
150 Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
151 Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 137.
152 See supra note 4, at 35.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 34.
155 Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S.
510, 515 (1997).
156 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
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In addition to recognizing important policy rationales for
interpreting section 510 to include unsolicited internal complaints, it is
also useful to compare the language of the ERISA antiretaliation
provision with analogous whistleblower provisions of other federal
statutes. Despite the vast majority of available federal statutes that
contain antiretaliation provisions, 157 this Comment compares the
whistleblower provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act158 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 159 These two statutes are appropriate points of
comparison because they respectively contain anti-retaliation provisions
that are narrower and broader than that within section 510; thus, they
offer the opportunity for a more expansive analysis.
The antiretaliation provision that is central to the FLSA prohibits
the “discharge or in any other manner [the] discriminat[ion] against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or relating to this Act . . . or
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding[.]”160 There is
currently a circuit split regarding the protection afforded by this section
to internal complaints. The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Sixth, Ninth, First
and Fifth Circuits have all held that internal complaints are protected
under the whistleblower provision of the FLSA. 161 The minority view,
adopted by the Second and Fourth Circuits, holds that internal
complaints are not protected under section 215.162 The Seventh Circuit
recently interpreted section 215 to protect against retaliation for internal
written complaints, but not internal oral complaints.163 The United States
Supreme Court, however, vacated this decision on March 22, 2011.164
The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether the
157 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and
28 U.S.C. (2006); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006); American with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C § 12203 (2006).
158 29 U.S.C.S. § 215 (2006).
159 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-3 (2006).
160 29 U.S.C.S. § 215 (2006).
161 See Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975); Love v.
RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); E.E.O.C. v. White & Sons
Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d
985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999); Hagan v. Echostar
Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008), respectively.
162 See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) and Ball v. Memphis
Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 360 (4th Cir. 2000) respectively.
163 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838, 840
(7th Cir. 2009), vacated, Kasten v, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S.Ct.
1325, 1336 (2011).
164 Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1325.
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phrase “filed a complaint” in section 215, includes oral as well as written
complaints.165 Finding the language of the statute to be ambiguous, the
Court relied on “the provision in conjunction with the purpose and
context” to conclude that oral complaints are protected within the
statutory provision.166 Despite this clarification, the Court declined to
address whether such a complaint must be made to a government agency,
or could be made internally to the employer.167
The FLSA system relies on information and complaints from
employees in order to secure compliance rather than requiring detailed
and continuous government supervision. 168 Section 215 of the FLSA
prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] or in any other manner
discriminat[ing] against any employee because such employee has filed
any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or relating to this Act[.]”169 The Supreme Court has made clear
that “the key to interpreting the anti-retaliation provision is the need to
prevent employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation’ for voicing grievances
about substandard conditions.” 170 As such, the FLSA whistleblower
provision is among the statutory provisions that have been expansively
construed to provide broad protective coverage to internal
complainants.171
Consistent with the majority of circuits regarding the FLSA
whistleblower provision, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act also extends to
internal complaints. 172 The relevant statutory language of Title VII
declares it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
“discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this title.” 173 This language is broad enough to include most
employee self-help actions. It declares it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because
that person “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment

165

Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1336.
167 Id.
168 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 121 (1987).
169 29 U.S.C.S. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
170 Brock, 812 F.2d at 124.
171 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 229–31 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Cowen, J., dissenting).
172 Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1992).
173 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
166
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practice by this title[.]” 174 In broadly construing the provision’s
protections, the term “employees” under section 704(a) extends to former
employees, 175 and bars retaliation in response to an employee having
filed charges against a former employer.176
Interpreting a similar antiretaliation provision in the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the Second Circuit has found that “Congress
sought to protect a wide range of activity in addition to the filing of a
formal complaint.”177 Although referring to the ADA, the Second Circuit
relied on the same reasoning to interpret Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision because of the similar statutory language. 178 Comparing
various federal statutory antiretaliation provisions and their
interpretations supports a broader reading of section 510, especially
considering the complete preemption doctrine. When enacting the
statute, Congress gave private parties a means of enforcing it, but at the
same time, subjected its provisions to complete preemption. It would be
illogical to deny certain employees protection, leaving them without a
remedy.
The Third Circuit, interpreting the Clean Water Act—which
contains language similar to that of section 510—concluded that the
word “proceeding” is ambiguous because its permissive applications can
encompass both formal and informal complaints.179 In so holding, the
court recognized an important public policy consideration that employees
should not be discouraged from “pursuing internal remedies before going
public with their good faith allegations.”180 Instead, employees should be
encouraged to “notify management of their observations before any
formal investigations and litigation are initiated,” thereby providing
management with the opportunity to correct, justify, or clarify policies or
otherwise “facilitate prompt voluntary remediation and compliance.”181
Imposing a standard that denies protections to employees who report
either potential or actual violations of ERISA to management would chill
174

Id.
See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that in order to
be more consistent with Title VII’s broad protections, “former employees are included
within § 704(a)’s coverage”). This section refers to retaliation in the form of a retaliatory
negative reference given to prospective new employers.
176 See Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1294–95 (8th Cir. 1980) (alleging that the
county prosecutor terminated plaintiff in retaliation for his discrimination charges against
his former employer sheriff).
177 Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir. 1989).
178 Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1992).
179 Passaic Valley Sewage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478 (3d
Cir. 1993).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 478–79.
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employee initiatives in recognizing “discrepancies in the workings of
their agency.”182
The language used in section 510 of ERISA is similarly ambiguous.
The provision prohibits any person from “discharg[ing], fin[ing],
suspend[ing], expel[ing], disciplin[ing], or discriminat[ing] against any
person because he has given information or has testified or is about to
testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]” 183 As the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concluded: “the safeguarding
effect of the fiduciary responsibility section [of ERISA] will operate
efficiently only if fiduciaries are aware that the details of their dealings
will be open to inspection, and that individual participants and
beneficiaries will be armed with enough information to enforce their own
rights[.]” 184 In light of this purpose and important public policy
considerations, the interpretation of section 510 by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits must be followed. Subsequently, as the conflicting holdings of
the circuits have resulted in a nonuniform application of federal law,
there is a compelling reason for the Supreme Court to correct the
conflict.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized section 510’s broad prohibition of
the termination or otherwise adverse treatment of employees who
exercise their ERISA rights or give information or testimony relating to
ERISA. 185 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 510, “is
clearly meant to protect whistle blowers.”186 These circuits recognize the
ambiguity of the language used in section 510, and as a proper step in
statutory interpretation, they next turn to legislative intent. Support for a
broad reading of section 510 can be found in the Senate Report from the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.187
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit’s finding that section 510’s use of
the words “inquiry or proceeding” connotes a narrow interpretation 188
and fails to afford the protection to employees that the Committee had in
mind. The Fourth Circuit also draws a parallel between the use of the
phrase “testified or is about to testify” to suggest that the language
“inquiry or proceeding” is limited to the legal or administrative realm
and that mere written or oral complaints to a manager are not within its
ambit.189 The Fourth Circuit stands alone in this proposition, as even the
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 479.
29 U.S.C.S. § 1140 (2006).
See supra note 4, at 27.
Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994).
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 428.
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Second Circuit—which relied heavily on the Fourth Circuit precedent in
its interpretation of section 510—refuses to draw the same parallel.190 It
is unquestionable that the language in section 510 is broader in scope
than that of section 215 of the FLSA. Section 510 uses the phrase “given
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding[,]”191 while section 215 uses the phrase “filed any complaint
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding[.]” 192 Filing a
complaint or instituting a proceeding are narrower courses of conduct
than merely giving information.
The Second Circuit, in finding that solicited internal complaints are
protected, determined that “proceeding” refers to the progression of a
lawsuit in an official and formal capacity, while “inquiry” refers broadly
to any request for information. 193 This interpretation, however, is
unworkable in some circumstances. For instance, where would one draw
the line between an unprotected initial step and a protected inquiry?
Judge Cowen addressed this question in his dissenting opinion in
Edwards:
[S]uppose an employee like Edwards complains to her superior,
the superior asks some follow-up questions, and the employee
responds to these questions. Are the informal responses to some
impromptu questions to be regarded as protected because they
evidently were made as part of an “inquiry?” In turn, why should
such responses be protected while, at the same time, an employer
is essentially permitted (and perhaps, in essence, encouraged) to
fire an employee immediately after she makes an informal
complaint instead of conducting an investigation of some sort? 194

Such a result is unworkable and clearly arbitrary.

190

Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2005) stating:
Although we agree with the Fourth Circuit that [s]ection 510 protects those
who engaged in ‘something more formal than written or oral complaints
made to a supervisor,’ we disagree that Congress’s use of the phrase ‘testify
or about to testify’ dictates that result. As we read the statutory text, the
reference to testimony is wholly irrelevant to our understanding of the
language ‘given information . . . in any inquiry or proceeding,’ which is at
issue in this case. Our interpretation of [s]ection 510 is based on the
respective meanings of the terms ‘inquiry’ and ‘proceeding,’ not the
juxtaposition of those terms with reference to testimony.

Id.
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29 U.S.C.S. § 1140 (2006).
29 U.S.C.S. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
193 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329.
194 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 228 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting).
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It appears that the circuit split in this instance is motivated by the
courts’ prior holdings regarding the whistleblower provision in the
FLSA. 195 The majority of circuits hold that unsolicited internal
complaints are protected under the FLSA, and the same result will likely
ensue regarding ERISA’s whistleblower provision once more circuits are
exposed to the conflict. Statutory interpretation requires that when the
language used by the legislature is ambiguous—which is clearly the case
with respect to section 510—courts should look to the legislative intent
underlying the Act. As expressed in the Senate Report predating
ERISA’s enactment, scholarly articles, and the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation, section 510 was enacted to protect employees and to
proscribe interference with the attainment of their rights.196 As such, to
promote compliance with the law and to give employers the opportunity
to correct potential deficiencies in their enforcement of ERISA, the
courts should not silence employees who are exposed to actual or
potential violations.
V. CONCLUSION
The unprecedented reliance of nearly 124 million 197 American
laborers on their retirement plans demands consistency and uniformity in
regulation. Congress enacted ERISA in response to the rapid growth in
plan participants, the need to confront noncompliance by employers, and
the resulting underfunding of employee benefit plans. 198 ERISA
demands that employers adhere to reporting and disclosure rules and
consequently endows the Secretary of Labor with the authority to ensure
195 A pattern has emerged in which courts that have found internal complaints to be
protected under the FLSA have made similar findings with respect to ERISA section 510.
Compare Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
that internal complaints are protected under the FLSA) and Lambert v. Ackerley, 180
F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that internal complaints are protected
under the FLSA) and Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding that internal complaints are protected under ERISA); Hashimoto v. Bank
of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that internal complaints are
protected under ERISA), with Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (holding that internal complaints
are not protected under ERISA); King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th
Cir. 2003) (holding that internal complaints are not protected under ERISA); Ball v.
Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that internal
complaints are not protected under the FLSA); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that internal complaints are not protected under the FLSA). The
Third Circuit has not yet ruled on the FLSA issue, but has found that internal complaints
are not protected under ERISA. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225.
196 See supra note 4, at 35; Rouco, supra note 42, at 632; Cummins, supra note 1, at
574; Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222–23.
197 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
198 Rouco, supra note 42, at 632.
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such compliance. It is likely, however, that only those people most
interested—the participants themselves—would recognize those
clandestine violations. If such employees are threatened with the
prospect of wrongful discharge for voicing concerns over violations of
the law, they will be silenced and employers will have little incentive to
correct such problems.
The current circuit split regarding the application of section 510 of
ERISA to unsolicited internal complaints reflects a lack of uniformity.
Ironically, a statute that demands complete preemption so as to maintain
consistency and uniformity in its application has in practice produced
variations in interpretations and a conflict among the circuits. As such,
in order to incentivize employer compliance with the terms of ERISA,
employees should be free to voice concerns over potential violations
without fear of retaliatory discharge. Invoking a broader realm of
protection for section 510 would also benefit employers who would be
able to address potential or actual violations of ERISA before becoming
the subject of formal investigations or disciplinary actions.
A comparison of the text in section 510 with analogous
antiretaliation provisions as well as the case law interpreting such other
statutes demands an extensive application of protection to plan
participants. Similar to the FLSA section 215, section 510 implicates a
standard somewhat more formal than mere “opposition” as such word is
used in Title VII. Notably, a majority of courts agree that section 215 of
the FLSA provides protection for unsolicited internal complaints.
Moreover, it is unquestionable that the ERISA anti-retaliation provision
is drafted more broadly than that of the FLSA. If section 215 is to be
extended to unsolicited internal complaints, so too should section 510.
Further support for such protection of unsolicited internal
complaints can be found in the legislative intent and the purpose behind
the promulgation of ERISA. Congress, compelled by various incidents
of misconduct by employers regarding pension plans, enacted ERISA to
provide protection and security to the nation’s laborers. 199 As the
Secretary of Labor—the individual given the authority to assure
compliance and adherence to the minimum standards set forth to protect
private employee benefits plans—expressed as amicus in Edwards,
regarding interpretation of section 510, protection should be extended
broadly to employees to effectuate a check on employer compliance.200
With the substandard conditions facing Congress at the time of
enactment—specifically, the lack of employer compliance, resulting in
199
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plan underfunding 201 —as well as public policy concerns that demand
protection for the nation’s workers in the wake of their old age, there can
be no other appropriate interpretation of section 510 other than one that
affords employees protection should they attempt to report an actual or
potentially illegal act. The language used by Congress should be
afforded its plain meaning; however, where language is ambiguous,
Congressional intent should next be considered. In the case of section
510, and the various terms used by Congress in other antiretaliation
provisions, the language is quite ambiguous. As such, legislative intent
should be considered, and in the case of section 510, Congress intended
for its protections to be expansive. 202 Furthermore, public policy
demands such an inclusive application.
As a nation founded upon a strong incentive to work, employees
should be encouraged to monitor their rights in the workplace. It is
incomprehensible to permit employer evasion from federal law and to
deny protection to the people such evasion harms. Congress, the
representatives of the people, could not have intended such a
counterintuitive result.
Employees providing unsolicited internal
complaints to management about actual or potential violations of ERISA
should be afforded protection from wrongful discharge in order to
effectuate the legislative intent and protect the rights of the nation’s
citizens.
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See supra note 4, at 9.
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